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Abstract
In the second half of 1997 many Asian emerging economies suffered large declines
in both their currency and equity markets.  This Asian financial turmoil arose
primarily from three interrelated sets of factors, namely: shortcomings in the
financial sector at a time when global liquidity conditions were accommodative,
concerns about balance of payments developments, and contagion across
economies.  The major channel of contagion appears to have been the sudden
realisation by the market – after the sharp depreciation of the Thai baht – that a
number of other Asian economies had vulnerabilities similar to those in Thailand.
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1. Introduction
As recently as November 1997, the events in Asian financial markets were
described as ‘a few little glitches in the road’.1 Now they are recognised as the third
major financial crisis of the 1990s.2 The main features of the turmoil have some
similarities to earlier episodes:
•  private capital markets withdrew their support from a group of countries that in
the previous several years had been recipients of large capital inflows;
•  the defensive package of foreign exchange market intervention, sharp rises in
interest rates and selective controls proved inadequate to avert the (downward)
floating of some formerly fixed exchange rates;
•  large unhedged foreign exchange positions and weak banking and financial
systems contributed to vulnerability and sharply constrained the authorities’
room for manoeuvre;
•  the trauma quickly spread out from its original locus to affect exchange rates
and other asset prices in the region (and for a short while, in major industrial
countries as well);
•  large, multilateral official rescue packages had to be mobilised; and
•  the  events have generated calls (both within the region and beyond)  for
stronger preventative arrangements to reduce the likelihood and severity of
future outbreaks.
                                        
1 President Clinton at the meeting of APEC heads of government in Vancouver.
2 The others being the crisis in the European Monetary System in 1992–93 and the Mexican
‘tequila crisis’ of 1994–95.2
While some of these factors are common to earlier crises, one of the unusual
features of the Asian turmoil is that it was centred in emerging economies which had
a record of strong economic growth, generally moderate inflation, and disciplined
fiscal policy for at least a decade. As is shown, however, mounting weaknesses in
other areas eventually took their toll. The most significant of these weaknesses were
in the financial sector, where strong capital inflows, extended periods of rapid
economic growth, rising property prices and perceptions of implicit government
guarantees led in some economies to a degree of complacency by banks in their
credit standards, which supervisory systems proved inadequate in disciplining. This
was compounded by some loss of confidence by markets in the longer term export
potential of some Asian economies.  Once these factors started currency
depreciations within the region, contagion effects exacerbated and spread them.
This paper presents an interpretation of the origins of the Asian financial turmoil.
Section 2 of the paper provides a capsule summary of developments in exchange
rates, exchange market intervention and reserves, interest rates and credit controls,
equity prices, real economic activity and trade flows, and international rescue
packages. Section 3 then turns to an analysis of the factors generating the crisis,
including the likely transmission channels for contagion. Section 4 provides some
conclusions.
2. What Happened?
When a country’s  foreign  exchange market is under pressure, that pressure is
typically reflected in exchange rates, international reserves, interest rates, and the
temporary imposition of controls on credit or foreign exchange transactions.3 The
combination depends on the circumstances of the particular country affected and on
the defensive strategy chosen by the authorities. In some cases, currency crises also
spill over into (or are caused by) other asset markets, including banking, equity and
bond markets. When the authorities are unable to regain the confidence of markets
on their own, they may ask the IMF and the World Bank, along with other
                                        
3 Indeed, these variables typically serve as the components of indices of exchange rate crises in
the growing literature on early warning indicators of currency crises; see, for example,
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), Goldstein and Reinhart (1998) and IMF (1998).3
countries, for assistance. As background to the subsequent discussion on origins,
this part of the paper reviews the main developments.
2.1 Exchange Rates
Although the Thai baht had been subject to episodic pressures during the previous
18 months, it was the intensification of these pressures in May  1997  and the
subsequent forced floating of the baht on 2 July that really ushered in the recent
turbulence in currency and equity markets. As shown in Figure 1, the second half of
1997 and the first weeks of 1998 witnessed sharp declines in the dollar exchange
rates of the ASEAN-4 economies. The worst affected was the Indonesian rupiah,
which at one stage was worth only a fifth of its June 1997 value against the US
dollar. The baht itself lost half its value while the Malaysian ringgit and Philippines
peso were down around 40 per cent at their lows. There were more modest declines
in the Singapore and Taiwan dollars over the same period. South Korea’s currency
initially held up better but depreciated heavily in November and December 1997,
Figure 1: Bilateral Exchange Rates
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also losing half its value by the low point. The Hong Kong dollar maintained its
parity despite strong market pressure and the Chinese renminbi was little affected.4
With hindsight, January 1998 now appears to have marked the worst of the
depreciations. All the affected currencies regained some strength during the first
quarter of 1998. The recovery has been most hesitant in Indonesia, the economy
about which most uncertainties remain.
On an effective (i.e. trade-weighted) basis, the ASEAN-4 and Korean currencies
recorded slightly smaller depreciations, the Singapore and Taiwan dollars were
relatively stable while the Hong Kong dollar and Renminbi appreciated.5 (Figure 2.)
Real effective exchange rates over the 1990s are shown in Figure 3 for seven Asian
emerging economies. Two observations merit mention. First, the combination of the
close (explicit or implicit) tracking of the US dollar by many Asian currencies and
large swings in the yen-dollar exchange rate have meant that the  ASEAN-4
currencies have shown marked medium-term fluctuations both with respect to the
yen and to a wider trade-weighted basket of exchange rates. Specifically, after
depreciating vis-à-vis the yen in the first half of the 1990s, the ASEAN-4 currencies
displayed real appreciation relative to the yen between early 1995 and mid 1997.
Their real effective exchange rates showed the same pattern, albeit much damped in
magnitude. These real appreciations relative to non-dollar currencies in the
18 month run-up to the current crisis are noteworthy because they presumably
contributed to any market concerns about overall exchange rate overvaluation.
                                        
4 Changes in exchange rates are calculated in terms of units of foreign currency (e.g. US dollar)
per unit of domestic currency, that is, the ‘world’ price of the domestic currency. This results
in smaller changes than using units of national currency per unit of foreign currency. For
example, a movement of the baht from 25 to 40 to the US dollar is regarded as a 37.5 per cent
depreciation, whereas the latter approach would calculate the depreciation as 60 per cent. A
disadvantage of the latter definition of the exchange rate is that changes of 100 per cent might
be interpreted as implying that the currency has lost all its value when that is surely not the
case.
5 The series used in Figure 2 are calculated by the RBA. The series used in Figure 3 are
calculated by JP Morgan and are based on baskets of 45 currencies.5
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Figure 3: Real Effective Exchange Rates
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Second, the recent depreciations of the  ASEAN-4 currencies have come from
different levels of their real effective exchange rates (relative to historical averages).
Whereas the real effective exchange rates of both the Philippine peso  and the
Singapore dollar were around 15 per cent above their average level of the previous
decade prior to the recent fall, the Thai baht and Indonesian rupiah were less than
10 per cent above and the South Korean won was below its medium-term average.
(Figure 3).
This comparison of movements of real effective exchange rates in the 1990s
suggests that, uncertainty about equilibrium real exchange rates notwithstanding, in
mid  1997 the extent of any exchange rate misalignments was quite modest in
comparison with the size of the subsequent depreciations.
The size of the Asian depreciations is placed into perspective in Table 1.  This
shows the 20 largest real effective depreciations over six-month periods since 1970
(excluding countries with inflation over 50 per cent as such calculations are
unreliable during hyperinflations). By comparison, the largest six-monthly change in
the G3 currencies over this period was the 1995 real depreciation in the yen of
around 20 per cent; some European currencies recorded similar real depreciations in
the ERM crisis and the Australian dollar had a  similar  real depreciation in the
mid 1980s. Taking Table 1 and Figure 3 together one gets an impression of just
‘how large’ have been these real depreciations in emerging Asia, both with respect
to historical experience and to simple proxies for equilibrium rates.7
Table 1: Real Effective Exchange Rates: 20 Largest Depreciations Since 1970



















South Africa 1985 -26
Chile 1982 -25
Source: JP Morgan real effective exchange rates based on price indices most closely measuring domestically
produced finished manufacturing goods (excluding food and energy). Data up to March 1998.
2.2 Exchange Market Intervention
It is not straightforward to describe the role played by exchange market intervention
as available data capture only part of these operations. Although the concept most
relevant for vulnerability to a speculative attack would be net international reserves
relative to some measure of potential liquid liabilities of the authorities
(Section 3.1), published data generally refer only to gross reserves and thus miss
intervention by the authorities in the forward market. As widely reported, such
forward market operations were an important element of the Thai defence, involving
a position which peaked at US$24 billion. The individual-country reserve figures
may also miss  co-ordinated intervention undertaken in support of currencies by8
(third party) monetary authorities or intervention that is funded through a country’s
fiscal accounts rather than its international reserves.  Furthermore, it has been
suggested that some of the Korean international reserves were not useable as they
had been lent to banks.
With these caveats in mind, Figure 4 shows the behaviour of gross international
reserves over the 1996–1997 period for  eight Asian economies.  It shows that
Thailand and South Korea initially relied much more on their reserves in defending
the exchange rate than did  Indonesia, Malaysia or the Philippines. One
interpretation is that the Malaysian and Indonesian authorities were mindful of the
large reserve losses suffered not only by Thailand but also by some other countries
in earlier vigorous but ultimately unsuccessful currency defences (e.g., the huge
interventions during the ERM crisis) and decided not to go far down that road; that
is, they intervened heavily for a short period and then turned to other measures. In
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the case of the Philippines, low initial reserve levels dictated limited reliance on
intervention as part of the defensive strategy.  Figure 4 also illustrates the large
reserve holdings of Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan relative to the ASEAN-4
countries. Despite its large stock of reserves, Taiwan opted on 20 October to allow
its currency to depreciate.
2.3 Interest Rates and Credit Controls
An important element in most currency defences is played by short-term interest
rates.  These are shown in Figure 5, with corresponding real rates shown in
Figure 6.6 Four developments should be noted. Firstly, the ASEAN-4 countries and
South Korea had increased interest rates during 1996, either to rein back excessive
credit growth or support the exchange rate. Consequently, they found themselves in
the first quarter of 1997 with already high short-term real interest rates. Some might
argue these high interest rates increased the vulnerability to attack because efforts
by speculators to push up the cost of ‘holding on’ to exchange rate commitments
begun from a relatively high base.
Secondly, as exchange market pressures intensified in 1997, each of the ASEAN-4
countries further increased short-term interest rates to combat those pressures. As
shown in Figure 5, short-term (nominal) interest rates in Thailand and Indonesia
displayed high volatility in 1997, especially from May onwards; in some episodes,
government policies and market pressures drove overnight rates to very high levels
(near 100 per cent in Indonesia, and over 350 per cent in the offshore Thai market),
albeit for relatively short time periods. Malaysia’s use of high interest rates was the
most limited among the ASEAN-4 countries. There was a large spike in early July
but rates then returned to pre-crisis levels.
                                        
6 Real rates are calculated by subtracting the most recent 12-month-ended percentage change in
consumer prices.  They therefore are likely to be overstated  in late 1997, by which time
expected inflation would have incorporated the inflationary impetus from the depreciations.10
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Sources: Bloomberg and Datastream (see footnote 6).11
Thirdly, reminiscent of the tactics employed by several European countries during
the 1992–93 ERM crisis (e.g., France, Ireland, Portugal and Spain), each of the
ASEAN-4 countries resorted to a mixture of administrative controls, taxes, and
moral suasion, aimed at discouraging capital outflows and short sales of both the
domestic currency and domestic equities, and at reducing the need for even larger
increases in domestic interest rates.7 In May 1997, the Thai authorities introduced
restrictions on the ability of local banks to extend baht credit to offshore banks, to
conduct foreign exchange swaps (baht for dollars), and to sell baht for dollars to
speculators in the spot offshore market. In July, the  Philippines authorities
prohibited local banks for three months from engaging in offshore, nondeliverable
forward peso contracts with offshore banks, and there are reports that the central
bank also used moral suasion to discourage local banks from making peso credit
available to those who might be expected to use it to speculate against the peso. The
Indonesian authorities resisted for longer any temptation to impose capital controls
but in August introduced limits on foreigners’ access to swap markets. In Malaysia,
a ban on short selling of equities was introduced but was soon lifted. A $20 billion
plan was also announced to support stock prices, under which shares sold by
Malaysians to state pension and investment funds would fetch a premium whereas
shares sold by foreigners would occur at market prices. In addition, Prime Minister
Mahathir has threatened on several occasions to introduce controls on foreign
exchange trading but these have not been implemented. When the Hong Kong dollar
was under strong attack in late October,  Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation (a private bank, but one that undertook some central bank functions
before the establishment of the  Hong  Kong Monetary Authority) temporarily
restricted withdrawals on time deposits to aid in the currency’s defence.
While it is difficult to know how exchange and interest rates would have behaved in
the second half of 1997 in the absence of these administrative measures, one thing is
clear: as in the ERM crisis, such administrative measures did not prevent ASEAN-4
exchange rates from declining sharply, nor did they obviate the need for domestic
interest rates to increase significantly.
                                        
7 These measures are described more fully in IMF (1997).12
2.4 Equity Prices
Figures 7 and 8 trace the evolution of equity prices in eight Asian emerging
economies, in the short term (since January 1997) and medium-term (since 1990),
respectively. The ASEAN-4 countries suffered steep falls in their equity markets in
the second half of 1997. As regards the four other Asian emerging economies
shown, Hong Kong and South Korea registered falls comparable with those in three
of the ASEAN-4 countries, whereas the decline has been more moderate (around
20 per cent) in Singapore and Taiwan.  As with their exchange rates, the equity
markets turned around in January 1998. By April 1998, most were higher than at the
start of the year, but still well down on mid 1997.
Turning to equity prices over the medium  term,  there are again  significant
differences across countries. Most dramatically, even before the crisis, Thai stock
prices had fallen by over 60 per cent from their peak in early 1994 and by end 1997
were about half their level at the beginning of the decade. In contrast, stock prices
had tripled in the Philippines over this decade, doubled in Malaysia and risen by
60 per cent in Indonesia.
The other east Asian emerging economies whose stock market performance in the
1990s have been as disappointing as Thailand’s are South Korea and Taiwan. In the
former, stock prices have fallen over 60 per cent since the peak (in late 1994) and
by end 1997 were about half their 1990 level. In contrast, even after the sharp fall in
late 1997, Hong Kong’s Hang Seng index had gone up over threefold since the
beginning of the decade.
The behaviour of equity markets is important because they serve as an alternative to
bank financing for some companies, because sharp changes in stock prices can
generate non-trivial wealth effects, because banks either use equities as collateral
for bank loans and/or invest themselves in equities, and because they  are an
important channel for foreign capital inflows. Moreover, they are often regarded as
a barometer of confidence in the domestic economy and as either an early warning
signal or precipitating factor in many past financial crises in emerging economies.8
                                        
8 See Mishkin (1996), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), and Goldstein and Reinhart (1998).13
Figure 7: Asian Equity Prices
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Figure 8: Asian Equity Prices
Monthly data; 1990 = 100




























2.5 Real Impact of the Financial Problems
One immediate effect of the financial crisis has been a contraction in real activity. In
Thailand, this is already apparent in the industrial production data which was
17 per cent lower in January 1998 than in January 1997. The other economies were
later to suffer their financial problems and there are longer lags in data releases.
However, an indication of the magnitude of the problem can be gleaned from a
comparison of the ‘consensus’ growth forecasts for 1998 made in June 1997 with
the latest forecasts made in April 1998. (The revision should capture the impact of
the financial crisis rather than any other factors thought likely to slow output before
the crisis.) Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea are the economies whose growth
has been most marked down, and the downgrades are the most severe recorded in
the 1990s. Real GDP is now expected to contract this year, despite the stimulus to
net exports from their depreciations, reflecting, inter alia, high interest rates, vastly
increased foreign currency debt obligations,  more widespread corporate and
banking failures, higher  layoffs, and the generalised uncertainty and loss of
confidence associated with such crises.
Table 2: Real GDP: Consensus Forecasts
Annual percentage change







Indonesia 7.8 4.6 7.6 -6.3 (-13.9)
Thailand 6.4 0.0 5.9 -4.1 (-10.0)
South Korea 7.1 5.5 6.1 -1.6 (-7.7)
Malaysia 8.6 7.8 8.0 1.1 (-6.9)
Singapore 6.9 7.8 7.3 2.7 (-4.6)
China 9.7 8.8 10.4 7.8 (-2.6)
Philippines 5.7 5.1 6.3 2.2 (-4.1)
Hong Kong 5.0 5.2 5.5 3.0 (-2.5)
Taiwan 5.7 6.8 6.5 5.9 (-0.6)
Source: Consensus Economics Inc Asia-Pacific Consensus Forecasts June 1997 and April 1998
There should be large movements in the current accounts of the affected economies.
Mexico changed its current account position by 6 per cent of GDP in the first year
after its mid 1990s crisis. Already South Korea and Thailand have recorded some15
monthly current account surpluses. The April consensus forecasts imply the
combined merchandise trade balance of Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea would
rise by almost US$50 billion between 1997 and 1999.
However, the available data thus far, illustrated in Figure 9, as well as the forecasts
for 1998, indicate that in the short term the change in trade balances will mainly
come from a sharp reduction in imports. At least thus far, the competitiveness
benefits for exporters seem to be outweighed by other factors such as difficulties in
exporters attracting finance or collapse of neighbouring markets.
Figure 9: Asian Merchandise Trade





















Sources: Bloomberg and Datastream
These data refer to the  US dollar value of merchandise exports and imports.
Stability in US dollar value of exports would be consistent with increased export
volumes (and so greater real GDP) if prices are being cut in US dollar terms, but
still mean that exports are not helping to rebuild reserves or increase national
income.16
2.6 International Rescue Packages
IMF-led rescue packages have been assembled for Thailand, Indonesia and South
Korea. Table 3 compares them with the previous largest rescue package, for Mexico
Table 3: International Rescue Packages
Thailand Indonesia South Korea Mexico
Date agreed 20 Aug 97 5 Nov 97 4 Dec 97 1 Feb 95
Latest revision 24 Feb 98 10 Apr 98 7 Feb 98
Total (US$bn) 17 35 58 52
of which:
IMF 3.9 9.9 20.9 17.8
World Bank 1.5 4.5 10 2.8
(a)
ADB 1.2 3.5 4
BIS/G10 10
USA 3 5 20
Europe 6.3
Canada 1
Australia 1 1 1
Brunei 0.5
China 1 1
Hong Kong 1 1
Indonesia 0.5






at 10 Apr 98
2.7 3.0 15.1
Time period 34 months 36 months 36 months
% of IMF quota 505 490 1 939 688
Targets (1998) original (latest revised) (1995)
Real GDP
(b) 3.5 (-3) 3 (-5) 2.5 (-1) 1.5
Inflation
(b) 5 (11) 9 (45) 5 (<10) 9 by end 95
Current account
(c) -3 (+4) -2 (+3) -2 (+5) -4
Budget balance
(c) 1 (-1½) 1 (-4) 0 (-2) 0.5
Notes: (a) World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank
(b)   Annual percentage change
(c)   Per cent to GDP
Sources: Compiled from IMF  website (www.imf.org);  Commonwealth Treasury of Australia (1998);  Banco
de Mexico.17
in 1995. The IMF contributions are large, especially relative to the size of their
quotas  (usually loans do not exceed two or three times a quota) and the
contributions from the rest of the world are also substantial. Japan has been the
largest contributor, followed by the US, although the latter was not involved with
the Thai package. It is noteworthy that Japan also has the largest share of bank
lending to the crisis countries, followed by Europe (principally Germany, France
and the United Kingdom), Hong Kong and the United States (Table 4).
Table 4: Nationality of Banks Providing Loans
US$ billion, end June 1997






Indonesia 23 6 5 5 4 6 61
Thailand 38 8 5 4 3 18 99
S. Korea 24 11 10 10 6 23 117
Malaysia 10 6 3 2 2 3 33
Philippines 2 2 2 3 1 4 17




4 4 3 20 10 0 71
Sources: G5 data from Bank for International Settlements The Maturity, Sectoral and Nationality Distribution of
International Bank Lending: First Half 1997. Basle January 1998. Hong Kong data from Hong Kong
Monetary Authority Monthly Statistical Bulletin September 1997. Totals from OECD/BIS Statistics on
External Indebtedness January 1998. (Mexico data from earlier issues.)
The packages have been subject to substantial revision, notably making the
budgetary demands less onerous, as the economic outlook for the economies has
deteriorated. No international package has been sought by Malaysia, although it has
voluntarily undertaken some reforms.  The Philippines agreed in July 1997 to
strengthen an ongoing IMF adjustment programme and received  access to over
US$1 billion in additional financing.
The  IMF’s assistance is subject to policy conditionality and in many cases the
supplementary facilities offered by other countries are also contingent on
compliance with these conditions. The performance criteria on monetary and fiscal18
policies have presumably been set with an eye toward improving the current
account, providing some government contribution to the cost of bank restructuring,
maintaining control of inflation, and braking the downward slide in exchange rates.
The original growth targets in these programmes have had to be revised downward,
as evidence accumulated that the breadth and depth of the crisis would be greater
than anticipated. The international rescue targets, in effect, put constraints not only
on exchange market intervention but also on the extent to which IMF resources can
be used for other purposes.
A distinguishing feature of these rescue packages is that they go much further into
reform of the financial sector and corporate governance than most IMF
programmes; see Tables 5 and 6. Common elements of the required conditions
include improved prudential supervision of the financial system, privatisation and
removal of anti-competitive practices.
Table 5: Financial Restructuring Elements of IMF–led Rescue Packages
Thailand Up-front separation, suspension and restructuring of unviable institutions … broader
structural reforms to restore a healthy financial sector … all remaining financial
institutions to strengthen their capital base expeditiously.
Indonesia The establishment of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency …[which] intervened in
the 54 banks that had [large] emergency borrowings from Bank Indonesia … some 250
examiners were placed in these banks to monitor the banks’ compliance with additional
prudential restrictions on, for instance, new credits and payments of dividends … the
Government will establish an Asset Management Company to focus on the debt recovery
of troubled assets … the government is also proceeding with the merger of state owned
banks … BI promulgated new classification and loan loss provisions based on
international standards … by June the Government will introduce into parliament a law
eliminating existing restrictions on foreign ownership of banks.
South Korea [An exit policy] to ensure the rapid resolution of troubled financial institutions in a
manner which minimises systemic distress and avoids moral hazard … the restructuring
and recapitalisation of all banks that fail to meet the Basle Committee capital standards
… this policy will include mergers and acquisitions by domestic and foreign institutions
… eliminate the [deposit] guarantee by the end of 2000 and replace it by a regular
deposit insurance system that will only protect small depositors and be financed solely by
contributions from the financial sector. [Large banks] will be required to have their
financial statements audited by internationally recognised firms. Disclosure standards
will require the publication of  … non performing loans, capital adequacy and ownership
structures and affiliations. [Legislation will] consolidate the supervisory functions [and]
allow prompt close of insolvent financial institutions. The authorities will allow
foreigners to establish bank subsidiaries and brokerage houses by mid 1998.
Source: Compiled from documents on the IMF website (www.imf.org)19
Table 6: Corporate Governance Conditions of IMF–led Rescue Packages
Some extracts
Thailand New bankruptcy law will permit corporate reorganisations; increase the scope for out-of-
court workouts and ensure fair treatment of creditors.
Indonesia Over the longer term, at a minimum, all enterprises that operate in competitive markets will
be privatised, with the government retaining only selected public utilities and strategic
companies … the Government will eliminate all restrictions on foreign investment in
wholesale trade and establish a level playing field in the import and distribution of essential
food items … the Government will implement by September 1998 the necessary regulations
establishing guidelines and clear procedures and mechanisms for mergers, acquisitions and
exit which facilitate efficient corporate restructuring while safeguarding against anti-
competitive or predatory behaviour.
South Korea Require financial statements of listed companies to be prepared and audited in accordance
with international standards, require publication of combined financial statements for
associated companies, further reduce the use of mutual guarantees by affiliates/
subsidiaries, increase the degree of independence of CPAs … require listed companies to
have at least one outside director, remove restrictions on voting rights of institutional
investors in listed companies, strengthen minority shareholders’ rights by substantially
lowering the thresholds on exercising these rights, review the possibility of allowing for
class action suits against corporate executives and auditors … ensure that all corporate
restructuring is voluntary and market-oriented, liberalisation of the domestic mergers and
acquisitions by removing the mandatory tender offer requirement, permit takeovers of non-
strategic Korean corporations by foreign investors without government approval … amend
bankruptcy law to facilitate more rapid resolution of bankruptcy proceedings.
Sources: Compiled from letters of intent sent to IMF from Thailand on 24 February and South Korea on
7 February 1998 and the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies of the  Government of
Indonesia of 10 April 1998. These are on the IMF website (www.imf.org)
The rationale for including corporate governance and transparency elements in these
programmes reflects the view that weaknesses in this structural area (non-
consolidated accounting statements, overleveraged conglomerates, cross-company
shareholding arrangements and guarantees, inefficient government monopolies and
cartels, absence of official subsidies from published government budget accounts,
etc) were one of the underlying elements of vulnerability.
3. Why did it Happen?
Like most other financial crises, the Asian financial turmoil was not due to one or
two isolated factors. Its multiple origins can be conveniently grouped under three
interrelated headings:  (i)  financial-sector  vulnerabilities such as poor credit20
assessment in some Asian emerging economies concurrent with relatively easy
global liquidity conditions; (ii) external sector problems which generated some
concern about these economies; and (iii) contagion from Thailand – first to its near
neighbours (Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines), thence to some other Asian
economies to the north (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan), and finally much
further afield (ranging south to Australia, east to Brazil and west to Russia). For a
time, there was even an impact on equity markets in the major industrial countries.
3.1 Financial Sector Vulnerability
Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines experienced a credit boom in the early
1990s while one developed in Malaysia in the mid 1990s. Table 7 shows that while
nominal GDP growth was rapid, bank and non-bank credit to the private sector
grew even faster.
Table 7: Bank Lending
Growth of bank credit to the private sector less growth in nominal GDP
1990–1994 1995 1996
Indonesia 10.4 4.4 5.7
Thailand 10.0 11.1 5.8
South Korea 2.6 2.2 -0.6
Malaysia 3.1 10.5 13.1
Philippines 10.7 27.4 31.5
Singapore 0.8 7.8 5.7
Hong Kong 8.8 8.9 -6.1
Source: Bank for International Settlements (1997, p. 108)
With such an  overextension of credit, the ASEAN-4 economies left themselves
vulnerable to a shift in credit conditions. When concerns about overheating and the
defence of exchange rates (with high interest rates) against strong market pressures
led to such a shift, it brought with it slackening economic activity, falls in property
prices, and a rising share of non-performing bank loans. Because the credit boom
began and ended earlier in Thailand and Indonesia than in Malaysia, the effects
were first visible in the former two countries.21
Large net private capital inflows (Table 12) provided an important component of the
credit boom and a significant portion of the lending was directed to real estate and
equities.  Exposure to the property market through loans to  homebuyers is not
particularly high in Asia.  What is high is the exposure of banks to property
developers, which is a much riskier form of exposure. It has been estimated that
total exposure to the property sector accounted for between 25–40 per cent of bank
loans in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, and even more than that in
Hong  Kong (JP  Morgan’s estimates are shown in  Table 8).  Also, in Thailand,
Malaysia and Indonesia this exposure was compounded by high loan-to-collateral
ratios. With a lot of office space still under construction, the decline in real property
prices in the region may have not finished yet, although some governments are
taking action to moderate the fall in property prices.
Table 8: Bank Lending to the Property Sector
Per cent of total bank lending
Home mortgages
(1993)
Total property (Loan as per cent of
collateral)
Hong Kong 9 40–55 (50–70)
Thailand 8 30–40 (80–100)
Malaysia 14 30–40 (80–100)
Singapore 15 30–40 (70–90)
Indonesia 4 25–30 (80–100)
South Korea 13 15–25 (80–100)






Sources: Kamin, Turner & Van’t dack (1998) Table 14; Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, December 1997
JP Morgan Asian Financial Markets 16 Jan 1998
Data is scarce on banks’ exposure to the equity market but the Korean banks are
believed to have large holdings of equities and Malaysian banks have reportedly lent
large amounts to finance stock purchases. This has contributed to the strains in both
these economies.22
In several of the Asian economies, financial vulnerability was exacerbated by banks
and/or their customers trying to reduce their funding costs by borrowing in foreign
currencies and at short maturities.
In Thailand there were several incentives for undertaking this kind of foreign
borrowing strategy. Firstly, interest rates abroad were much lower (about half as
high) than in Thailand. Secondly, the long-running stability of the baht relative to the
US dollar presumably led borrowers to believe that the risk of baht devaluation was
low. While the exchange rate between the US dollar and the yen was subject to
substantial fluctuation, only a sharp appreciation of the yen would wipe out the
savings from very low Japanese interest rates. Thirdly, as part of the government’s
effort to promote Bangkok as a regional financial centre, the Bangkok International
Banking Facility had been established in 1993, with a mandate (and special
incentives) to borrow abroad in foreign currency and to lend to other borrowers in
the region (so-called ‘out-out’ operations); in the event,  while facilitating such
foreign borrowing, most of the proceeds appear to have been lent to Thai entities
(‘out-in’ operations). Finally, in two earlier banking crises, the government had a
track record of intervening to support troubled financial institutions and of not
allowing banks to fail; in other words, an official safety net might have been
expected to reduce if not eliminate risk.
Currency mismatching by companies was the greater problem in Indonesia. Once
the rupiah was floated, belated efforts by Indonesian firms to hedge their large short
foreign-currency position in the market helped accelerate its decline. This
established a vicious circle, whereby the currency weakened further, prompting
more defensive selling.
In South Korea, the vulnerability arose from the short-term foreign currency
borrowings by banks and the chaebol. In Malaysia and the Philippines, the scale of
foreign borrowing over the 1990s was also considerable, but on the whole, maturity
and currency mismatches were apparently kept under better control than in Thailand
or Indonesia.
Table 9 provides several measures of liquidity and currency mismatches for the
Asian emerging economies (as well as some other developing countries). In short it
supports the view that South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia were particularly23
vulnerable to liquidity and currency mismatches in the run-up to the recent turmoil.9
Thailand and South Korea would look even more vulnerable in these comparisons if
commitments in forward markets or loans to commercial banks were netted off the
gross reserves used in such ratios.
Table 9: Liquidity and Currency Mismatch Variables















Indonesia 6.2 1.6 0.2 0.6
Thailand 4.9 1.1 0.5 0.7
South Korea 6.2 3.0 0.7 0.7
Malaysia n.a. 0.6 0.4 0.6
Philippines 4.9 0.7 0.2 0.6
China 8.2 n.a. n.a. 0.5
Taiwan 5.8 n.a. n.a. 0.9
Argentina 3.6 1.1 0.2 0.5
Brazil 3.5 0.7 0.2 0.6
Chile 1.8 0.4 0.3 0.4
Mexico 4.2 1.3 0.2 0.5
Sources: (a) IMF International Financial Statistics April 1998 and Taiwan Financial Statistics February 1998.
‘Broad money’ is ‘money plus ‘quasi-money’ (lines 34 plus 35). International reserves are total
reserves less gold (line 1l.d.).
(b) and (c) World Bank (1998)
(d) BIS Maturity, Sectoral and Nationality Distribution of International Lending, First Half of 1997,
January 1998.
The conclusion that it was the composition of foreign borrowing – and not so much
the total external debt burden  – that underpinned the vulnerability of the crisis
countries is reinforced by the external debt figures shown in Table 10. In terms of
                                        
9 Calvo and Goldstein (1996) show that such liquidity and currency mismatches made Mexico
more vulnerable to attack in 1994 than its Latin American neighbours.24
Table 10: External Debt Burden
Total external
debt as per cent
to 1996 GDP
Total external
debt as per cent
to 1996 exports
1997 repayments
due as per cent
to 1996 exports
Indonesia 49 189 67
Thailand 59 154 90
South Korea 23 72 37
Malaysia 38 42 19
Philippines 59 140 61
Singapore 11 n.a. n.a.
Hong Kong 21 15 7
China 16 n.a. n.a.
Argentina 30 320 133
Brazil 15 n.a. n.a.
Chile 31 117 14
Mexico 44 139 46
Source: Debt and repayments (i.e. short-term debt plus long-term debt repayments due) from OECD External
Debt Statistics 1997, GDP and exports from  IMF International Financial Statistics, March 1998
(lines 99b, 90c). China’s GDP from national source.
external debt to GDP Thailand and the Philippines had higher burdens than their
neighbours but those were not far outside the range experienced by many emerging
economies.  Similarly, only Indonesia among the five most adversely affected
economies has a high debt burden relative to exports (and still below that of both
Argentina and Brazil). The figures on the currency composition of external debt
shown in Table 11 likewise reinforce the point that the vulnerability of the crisis
countries was not tied to the foreign-currency denomination of external debt per se,
but rather to the imbalance between short-term foreign-currency denominated
liabilities and liquid foreign-currency denominated assets (international reserves).
These credit booms, asset price bubbles and liquidity/currency mismatches were
unlikely to have gone so far were it not for the accompanying  long-standing
deficiencies in financial-sector supervision. Common problems in emerging25
Table 11: Currency Denomination of Foreign Debt
Per cent of total long-term debt (1996)
US$ Yen Major European Other
(a)
Indonesia 24 35 11 30
Thailand 32 45 4 19
Malaysia 56 28 4 12
Philippines 34 35 3 28
China 65 16 2 17
Argentina 58 9 18 15
Brazil 69 6 8 17
Chile 46 9 5 40
Mexico 68 8 7 17
Note: (a) includes SDRs and other multi-currency.
Source: World Bank (1998)
economies include lax loan classification and provisioning practices.10 ‘Connected
lending’ (making loans to major shareholders, bank directors, managers, and their
related businesses) was allowed to flourish, with the concomitant dangers of
concentrated credit risks and lack of impartial credit decisions. Too many banks
were owned by governments and became the ‘quasi-fiscal’ agents of governments,
providing an oblique mechanism for channelling government assistance (off-budget)
to ailing industries. In some cases this directed lending was also undertaken by
privately  owned banks.  With the exceptions of  Hong  Kong and Singapore, the
riskiness of banks’ operating environment was not matched by an appropriate level
of capital. History led to the strong expectation that depositors and creditors would
get bailed out should banks get into trouble. In the face of strong political pressures
for regulatory forbearance, bank supervisors lacked the mandate to resist. Adding to
these problems, the quality of public disclosure and transparency was questionable.
There have been sharp rises in reported non-performing loans recently; although
many private sector estimates are higher still.
Of course, every borrower of foreign funds in these economies had a corresponding
lender overseas.  These lenders’ enthusiasm for emerging markets recovered
                                        
10 See Goldstein (1997).26
surprisingly quickly after the Mexican crisis. Indeed 1996 was a record year for
private net flows to emerging economies. Spreads on emerging economy bonds
narrowed markedly between 1995 and mid 1997; according to Cline and
Barnes (1997) by more than can be explained either by  upgradings by ratings
agencies or by fundamentals. Moreover,  maturities were extended and loan
covenants were watered down. East Asian economies accounted for half the top ten
recipients of private capital flows. (Table 12 and Figure 10)
Table 12: Five Asian Economies: External Financing
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, South Korea; US$ billions
1994 1995 1996 1997(e) 1998(f)
Current account -25 -41 -55 -27 31
Private flows, net 38 79 97 -12 0
  direct equity 5 5 6 6 7
  portfolio equity 7 11 12 -4 10
  bank lending 23 50 56 -27 -20
  other private lending 2 14 23 13 3
Official flows, net 7 5 -2 30 26
  International financial institutions 0 0 -2 23 23
  Bilateral creditors 8 6 0 8 3
Other flows (balancing item) -15 -29 -22 -31 -5
Reserves (- is increase) -5 -14 -18 40 -52
Source: Institute of International Finance (1998)
The proximity of Tokyo, a large financial centre offering extremely low interest
rates, also proved a temptation. The combination of weak economic activity, a huge
stock of bad loans in the banking system, and a public antipathy to bailing-out
banks, seemed to point to the continuation of low interest rates there. (The large
share of bank lending coming from Japan is shown in Table  4 and the high
proportion of debt denominated in yen in Table 11.) Furthermore, as had been the
case with Mexico, the ASEAN-4 economies were generally regarded by lenders as
in the first tier of sovereign borrowers among emerging markets. There were27
certainly some good reasons for this; over the previous decade they had been the
star performers in terms of economic growth, plugged themselves into global
markets, and had high saving and investment rates, and enviable fiscal positions.11
The modest levels of public debt may have (falsely) assured lenders that if local
financial institutions encountered troubles, the public sector had the capacity to
mount a prompt and comprehensive rescue. All these positive attributes led bankers
to overlook their weaknesses almost until (or in some cases after) the crisis hit.
Figure 10: Concentration of Private Capital Flows
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Source: World Bank (1997)
3.2 External Sector Problems
As Table 13 shows, Thailand’s current account deficit reached 8 per cent of GDP in
1996, with the other ASEAN-4 countries also having significant deficits.
                                        
11 See Grenville (1998).28
Table 13: Saving and Investment






Indonesia -3.8 1.2 28.7 32.1
Thailand -8.0 2.3 33.6 42.5
South Korea -4.8 0.1 34.3 38.2
Malaysia -6.3 0.7 37.8 41.5
Philippines -4.5 0.3 19.6 24.2
Singapore 15.2 7.0 51.3 35.1
Hong Kong (a) (a) (a) 32.4
Taiwan 4.0 -0.7 25.9 21.2
Argentina -1.4 -1.8 n.a. 17.6
Brazil -2.5 n.a. 13.5 19.1
Chile -4.1 2.2 22.6 27.7
Mexico -0.6 n.a. n.a. 20.9
Australia -4.1 -1.0 17.5 20.6
Germany -0.6 -2.1 n.a. 22.6
United Kingdom 0.0 -4.7 16.3 15.8
United States -1.9 -1.5 16.0 17.2
Notes: (a) Full balance of payments and timely GNP statistics are not compiled yet for Hong Kong but Ma and
Hawkins suggest the current account may have been in surplus in 1993 and in deficit of the order of
1 per cent of GDP in 1994 in ‘Hong Kong’s Balance of Payments: Some Research Estimates’ Hong
Kong Monetary Authority Quarterly Bulletin February 1997. Using GDP as a proxy for GNP, saving/
GDP is 31%. Government accounts are not given in the IFS but the budget is in surplus.
Sources: IMF  International Financial Statistics  April 1998; Taiwan data from domestic authorities; current
accounts are JP Morgan estimates for Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines.
However, these current account imbalances were widely viewed as benign (at the
time) in two respects. Firstly, there was a belief (known variously as the ‘Lawson
doctrine’, ‘Pitchford critique’ or ‘consenting adults view’) that current accounts
were only a concern if they reflected public sector deficits. This was not the case in
the ASEAN-4  economies. Secondly, the funds borrowed offshore were being
employed to increase investment (rather than consumption), thereby building the29
potential capacity to service the debts.  In both these dimensions, Asian current
account deficits were said to be more sustainable than those in Latin America.
Gradually, however, this sanguine interpretation was challenged on at least five
counts;
•  The  quality rather than just the quantity of investment assumed greater
importance.  Investment ratios of 30–40 per cent plus began to look less
attractive when much of it was directed toward speculative activities such as
golf resorts and expensive condominiums, industries where overcapacity was
threatening or over-ambitious infrastructure projects.
•  Real effective exchange rates pointed to some deterioration in competitiveness
in much of emerging Asia in 1996 (Figure 3). These overvaluations were not
particularly large but, when accompanied by large imbalances in the balance of
payments, they nevertheless increased vulnerability.12
•  Merchandise export receipts slowed in 1996 (Figure 10).  In Thailand, they
were almost unchanged in 1996, after rising 24 per cent in 1995. While it was
acknowledged at the time that some of the slowdown was attributable to
temporary factors, such as a slowdown in global trade and an inventory glut in
the worldwide electronics industry (which was especially important as
electronics account for a large share of exports in many Asian emerging
economies) the export slowdown did raise questions about longer term
projections.
•  Competition from China became more of a concern. More specifically, some
analysts detected a shift in perceived regional comparative advantage toward
China and away from the ASEAN-4 economies.13 Closer analysis by Fernald,
                                        
12 Empirical analyses of early-warning indicators of currency crises in emerging economies (see
Goldstein and Reinhart (1998), Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) and IMF (1998)) find
that real exchange rate overvaluation has historically been among the best performing crisis
signals.
13 For example, Thurow (1998) asserts the ASEAN-4 economies swing from trade ‘surplus to
deficit is directly traceable to mainland China’s decision to concentrate on increasing exports as
the engine of its economic growth’. Some others emphasised the rising share of China (versus30
Edison and Loungani (1998) suggests this concern may have been misplaced.
They conclude that China’s export growth is similar to that in other developing
Asian economies, rather than gaining at their expense.
•  Overproduction and intense export competition in certain industries was seen
as a looming threat to the sustainability of Asian external deficits. Industries for
which concerns were voiced about global overproduction included some
(automobiles, memory chips, petrochemicals, steel, cement, wood products,
frozen chickens, etc) of importance for the Asian economies.
3.3 Contagion
The factors discussed in the last two sections provide an explanation of why some
Asian emerging economies and currencies were vulnerable.  But most of these
factors did not appear overnight in July 1997. Why did so many Asian currencies
come under attack in so short a space of time? Here some kind of contagion must
surely be part of the answer.
Past empirical work on this topic has established that contagion is typically greater
during turbulent periods than more tranquil times, that it operates more on regional
than on global lines, and that it usually runs from large countries to smaller ones.14
In this last respect, the Asian currency crisis is unusual, in that it originated in a
relatively small country (Thailand) and spread to a wide set of economies, both
large (Korea, Japan, Brazil, Russia) and small.
There are three ways contagion might spread. The first is via direct linkages, the
second is through competitive devaluations, and the third is through signalling. The
first of these does not seem to provide a good explanation for the recent Asian
experience.  Table 14 shows some indicators of the importance of the bilateral
relationship with Thailand. In terms of their bilateral links, Malaysia, Singapore,
Taiwan and Hong Kong would have been more vulnerable than Indonesia and South
Korea; but this is not consistent with the observed impact of the crisis across
                                        
the static share of the ASEAN-4 countries) in Japanese FDI. Other examples are cited by
Fernald, Edison & Loungani (1998).
14 See Calvo and Reinhart (1996).31
economies (e.g. the size of currency and equity declines, the downward revision of
1998 growth forecasts).
Table 14: Bilateral Relationships with Thailand






Malaysia 1 180 125 4.6 2.5 0.40
Singapore 1 430 135 3.0 3.7 0.43
Taiwan 2 530 330 3.1 4.2 0.50
Hong Kong 1 730 160 0.4 <2 0.50
Philippines 2 210 195 1.8 <2 0.39
Indonesia 2 310 295 2.2 1.3 <0.4
South Korea 3 720 440 1.8 1.3 0.44
Sources and definitions: Distance and flying time: kilometres between capital cities and flight times (minutes)
on common flights between them. Source: Microsoft, Bloomberg. Export market: per
cent share of country’s exports which went to Thailand in 1996. Source: IMF Direction
of Trade Statistics. 1997 Telephone calls: Incoming calls to Thailand in millions of
minutes as a percentage share of all international calls from that country.  Source:
TeleGeography Inc  TeleGeography 1997/98: Global Telecommunications Traffic
Statistics and Commentary October 1997 Export similarity: A measure of the similarity
of the product composition of exports with those of Thailand, and hence, its role as a
competitor in world markets, taken from Williamson (1996) using a 4-digit industry
classification and 1992 data.
The second means by which contagion could arise is through the competitiveness
dynamics of devaluation. As one country after another in a region succumbs, those
countries surviving find themselves less competitive which in turn makes their
currencies more vulnerable to speculative attack, a sort of ‘domino theory’ of
devaluations.15
A third possible cause of contagion is signalling; international investors were
startled by events in Thailand, leading them to reassess the creditworthiness of all
                                        
15 Some (e.g. Thurow 1998) argue that the initial trigger for the devaluations in the region was
the Chinese official devaluation in January 1994. However, because of the large share (perhaps
80 per cent) of transactions conducted at the market rather than the official rate before the two
were unified by a devaluation of the official rate, the true devaluation was much less. See Liu,
Noland and Robinson (1998) and Fernland, Edison and Loungani (1998). In addition the latter
show that export competition between China and the rest of emerging Asia was much greater
in 1989–93 than in 1994–96.32
Asian borrowers.16 They found a number with similar weaknesses, in kind if not in
degree, and thus wrote the other economies down as well.
There are at least two reasons for favouring this third characterisation. One is that
markets appeared to be ‘asleep at the wheel’ in terms of monitoring latent risks in
emerging Asian markets prior to the Thai crisis.17 Eschweiler (1997), for example,
documents that interest rate spreads gave no warning of impending difficulties for
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, and produced only intermittent signals for
Thailand.  Similarly, Wolf (1997) comments  ‘two leading credit rating services,
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s failed to downgrade long-term debt ratings of
Indonesia, Malaysia or Thailand in the year and a half to June 1997. Instead,
downgradings followed the crisis – and exacerbated it’. (Figure 11).
A second reason for  favouring the third characterisation is based on some
calculations involving ranking seven Asian emerging economies according to
fourteen fundamentals identified as important in the literature.18 A simple average
ranking, which places Thailand (the first economy to get into trouble) as most
vulnerable, indicates Indonesia (the economy subsequently worst affected) as
second-most vulnerable. Fundamental-based  rankings correspond much more
closely to the observed impact on economies than do rankings of the economies on
the basis of their bilateral relationship with Thailand.
                                        
16 The impact of the news in Thailand was exacerbated by how much of it was received so
quickly – the loss of reserves, the float, the approach to the IMF, the problems in the financial
system etc. The fact that the rapid growth in the economies was termed by many ‘the Asian
miracle’ implied that its basis was not that well understood, which perhaps exacerbated the
tendency to panic when it seemed to be faltering.
17 See Radelet and Sachs (1998) for a comprehensive discussion of how unexpected was the
Asian crisis.
18 The fundamentals used were excess credit growth, the ratio of short-term external debt to
international reserves, the ratio of broad money to reserves, the ratio of external debt to GDP,
the banking sector’s risk-weighted capital ratio, the share of non-performing loans, the
importance of state-owned banks, bank credit-ratings, the ratio of the current account to GDP,
international reserves, the extent of the 1996 export slowdown and three measures of the
overvaluation of the real effective exchange rate. Data on most of these factors are presented
in Figures 3, 4 and 9 and Tables 7, 9, 10 and 13. Details of the calculations are available from
the authors. Another result of this exercise worth mentioning is that Hong Kong and Singapore
consistently rank higher on the fundamentals than do the other economies, suggesting there
were good reasons for their being less affected.33
Figure 11: Country Credit Ranking
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4. Conclusions
Asian financial turmoil arose primarily from three interrelated sets of factors. The
first factor was shortcomings in the financial sector, including deficiencies in the
supervision of banks which allowed a degree of exuberance to translate into an
excessively rapid expansion of credit. This was compounded by a second factor, a
reassessment by markets of the longer term export potential of some Asian
economies.  These concerns were initially manifest in Thailand but then quickly
spread across the other economies in the region.  The major channel for this
contagion appears to have been the sudden realisation by the market that a number
of other Asian economies had vulnerabilities similar to those in Thailand.
Just as the crisis did not arise from a single source, there is not a single response
that will fix it. Resolution of the current problems in Asia is likely to require, inter
alia,  recapitalisation of banks, structural reforms in the financial sector and to
corporate governance, greater transparency, and some debt rescheduling that34
involves appropriate burden-sharing on the part of private sector creditors. These
issues are beyond the scope of this paper but are taken up in Goldstein (1998).
The better we can understand the origins of the Asian financial crisis, the more
likely are policy-makers to learn from it rather than to repeat the mistakes in another
context.35
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